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Introduction 
Anyone who has been stopped at a sobriety check-
point, screened at an international border, scanned by 
a metal detector at an airport or government building, 
or drug tested for public employment has been sub-
jected to an administrative search or seizure. Searches 
of public school students, government employees, and 
probationers are characterized as administrative, as are 
business inspections and- increasingly-wiretaps and 
other searches used in the gathering of national secu-
rity intelligence. In other words, the government con-
ducts thousands of administrative searches every day. 
None of these searches requires either probable cause 
or a search warrant. Instead, courts evaluating admin-
istrative searches need only balance the government's 
interest in conducting the search against the degree of 
intrusion on the affected individual's privacy to deter-
mine whether the search is reasonable. This reasonable-
ness balancing is very deferential to the government, 
and the resulting searches are almost always deemed 
reasonable. As a result, the administrative search ex-
ception functions as an enormously broad license for 
the government to conduct searches free from constitu-
tional limitation. 
Formulating the boundaries and requirements of 
administrative search doctrine is therefore a matter of 
great importance, and yet the rules governing admin-
istrative searches are notoriously unclear. Much of the 
*Adapted by permission from Disentangling Adminis-
trative Searches, 111 Columbia Law Review 254(2011) 
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mischief in administrative search law can be traced to 
the Supreme Court's conflation of two distinct types 
of searches within one doctrinal exception. For ease of 
reference, I will call them "dragnet searches" and "spe-
cial subpopulation searches." Dragnets came first, and 
special subpopulation searches came later, but with-
out any clear understanding that something new was 
afoot. As the category of administrative searches tried 
to accommodate both kinds of searches as if they were 
the same thing, it gradually lost the ability to impose 
meaningful limitations on either one. 
... the administrative search 
exception functions as an 
enormously broad license for the 
government to conduct searches 
free from constitutional limitation 
When the concept of administrative searches first 
entered the law in the 1960s, it was designed for drag-
net intrusions- searches or seizures of every person, 
place, or thing in a specific location or involved in a 
specific activity. Such intrusions were permissible if 
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they involved only minimally intrusive government 
actions necessary to protect important health or safety 
interests that an individualized probable cause regime 
could not sufficiently protect. Before the Court would 
approve a dragnet, the government had to demonstrate 
that it was acting pursuant to either a warrant or a 
statutory regime that imposed clear limits on execu-
tive discretion. Typical examples of dragnet intrusions 
included safety inspections of all homes in a neighbor-
hood, checkpoint searches of all persons driving on a 
particular roadway, and inspections of all businesses in 
a particular industry. 
In the 1980s, the Court added special subpopulation 
searches to the category of administrative searches. 
According to the Court, certain people (or people act-
ing in certain capacities) have reduced expectations of 
privacy relative to the public at large, such that public 
officials need not satisfy the traditional warrant and 
probable cause requirements before searching them. 
Instead, officials can conduct searches on the basis 
of some lower level of individualized suspicion. Ex-
amples of special subpopulation searches included 
searches of public school students, probationers, and 
government employees. 
Because these two kinds of intrusions raise different 
issues, each was· once properly limited by a different 
set of doctrinal safeguards. Once they were both la-
beled "administrative," however, they were regarded 
as making up a single category, and the safeguards 
surrounding each kind of administrative search faded 
away as judges applied inapposite lessons from one 
kind of search to the other. The result is a doctrine that 
imposes few limits on government conduct and paves 
the way for indiscriminate searches and seizures. To 
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clarify and improve this area of the law, I argue that 
we should disentangle the two strands of administra-
tive search doctrine and restore the Fourth Amend-
ment safeguards that existed in each context before the 
cross-contamination. 
Dragnets (1967-1984) 
The Supreme Court first recognized the pemiissi-
bility of dragnet administrative searches in Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), when it sug-
gested that routine government inspections of homes 
for housing code violations could be conducted with-
out individualized showings of probable cause. The 
housing inspections at issue were not conducted on 
the basis of any particularized reason to believe that 
a given house was in violation of the housing code. 
Rather, government officials executed a general plan 
of inspecting every home in a given geographic area. 
The government fully expected that many or even most 
of the homes would be in compliance with the housing 
codes, such that the inspections would burden many 
law-abiding homeowners. If the normal requirement of 
individualized probable cause were in force, therefore, 
such inspections would violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Rather than categorically rejecting dragnet searches, 
however, the Court carved out an exception. In stating 
that generalized housing inspection programs can pass 
muster, the Court emphasized the importance of the 
government's interest in protecting community health 
by ensuring that homes are up to code. On the other 
side of the balance, the Court noted that "because the 
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at 
the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a rela-
tively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." 
That said, the importance _of the government's inter-
est and the minimally intrusive nature of the search 
were only necessary conditions, not sufficient ones, 
for exempting the housing inspection program from 
the default rule requiring individualized suspicion. As 
the Court emphasized, dispensing with individualized 
showings of probable cause was appropriate only be-
cause the government's important health and safety 
interests could not be served effectively through in-
dividualized canvassing techniques. The Court noted 
that many housing conditions raising health and safety 
issues, such as faulty wiring, "are not observable from 
outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to 
the inexpert occupant himself." As a result, the Court 
concluded, the government need not have individual-
ized probable cause before conducting a housing in-
spection. Rather, it could rely on area-wide probable 
cause that searches in a particular neighborhood would 
reveal housing code violations. 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters 
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In the 10 years after Camara was decided, the Su-
preme Court permitted administrative searches only 
for routine fire code inspections and regular inspec-
tions of certain highly regulated and intuitively dan-
gerous businesses-namely firearms dealers and liquor 
establishments-to ensure compliance with statutory 
record-keeping requirements and licensing restrictions. 
See U.S. v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade 
Catering Co. v. U.S., 397 U.S. 72 (1970); See v. City of 
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). As was true with the Ca-
mara housing inspections, the dragnet inspections in 
these cases involved minimally intrusive government 
invasions conducted for important health and safety 
reasons that could not have been adequately served by 
an individualized probable cause regime. 
During that same time period, the Court struck 
down many proposed administrative searches-even 
minimally intrusive ones-because alternative regimes 
predicated on individualized suspicion could reason-
ably serve the government's interests. For example, the 
Court rejected various government attempts to employ 
roving vehicle stops, noting the availability of alter-
native, individualized suspicion regimes that could be 
equally effective in serving the government's stated in-
terests. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); 
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-
Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring). If the government could labor under the indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement and still successfully 
abate hazardous conditions, then there was no good 
reason to expose large numbers of innocent people to 
unnecessary dragnets. 
In addition to ensuring that administrative searches 
were employed only when they were (1) justified in 
light of the balance of interests and (2) necessary be-
cause a regime of individualized suspicion could not 
effectively serve the government's interest, the Court 
was careful to limit the conduct of such searches in 
order to protect citizens against arbitrariness. After 
all, even if administrative searches are limited as de-
scribed above, there remains a danger that government 
officials will use them in arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
harassing ways. The normal method of protecting citi-
zens against arbitrary searches is to limit the discretion 
of executive officials, either by requiring that a neutral 
decisionmaker issue a warrant before a government in-
trusion occurs or by requiring the government to jus-
tify an intrusion after the fact by pointing to facts es-
tablishing a required level of individualized suspicion. 
Obviously, the ex post alternative was inapposite for 
the dragnet scenario, because dragnets are undertaken 
without individualized suspicion. Accordingly, the 
Court would approve only dragnet intrusions that were 
authorized in advance through a mechanism designed 
© 201 2 Thomson Reuters 
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to eliminate the danger of arbitrariness that would arise 
if executive officials had discretion regarding how and 
whom to search. 
The most common method of eliminating executive 
discretion in administrative searches during this early 
period was requiring the government to obtain a war-
rant for an "area inspection" before conducting a drag-
net search. The San Francisco Municipal Code ordi-
nance at issue in Camara authorized housing officials 
to inspect apartment buildings "at least once a year and 
as often thereafter as may be deemed necessary" so 
long as the inspections were conducted "at reasonable 
times." The Court struck down the program, noting 
that "[t]he practical effect of this system is to leave the 
occupant subject to the discretion of the officer in the 
field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private 
property which we have consistently circumscribed 
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the 
need to search." The Court emphasized that the war-
rant need not be a traditional individualized warrant; 
it could be a warrant to search the apartment homes in 
a given area, supported by probable cause that an area 
search would reveal housing code violations. But the 
Court recognized that some form of oversight was nec-
essary in order to protect homeowners from arbitrary 
government intrusions conducted under the cover of 
the dragnet exception. 
For the next 15 years, when the Court confronted 
the question of a dragnet's legitimacy under the Fourth 
Amendment, it examined the degree to which the re-
gime authorizing the dragnet search limited the dis-
cretion of the officials conducting the search. The Su-
63 
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preme Court struck down the Border Patrol's practice 
of stopping and searching cars near the border without 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because of the 
discretion that the program gave to border patrol offi-
cers. See U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Even 
fixed checkpoints near the border were impermissible 
if checkpoint officials had discretion to select which 
cars to search at the fixed locations. See U.S. v. Ortiz, 
422 U.S. 891 (1975). 
When the Court did depart from the warrant re-
quirement as a means of circumscribing government 
discretion during this time period, it substituted other 
requirements designed to limit government discretion. 
In U.S. v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court up-
held the warrantless search of a pawn shop pursuant 
to a statutory inspection regime targeted at businesses 
selling guns and ammunition. Although the Court did 
not dwell on the need to limit government discretion, 
it specifically noted that the regulatory scheme ensured 
that inspections were "carefully limited in time, place, 
and scope." 
Nine years later, in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 
(1981 ), the Court discussed the substitution of statutes 
or regulations for warrants at somewhat greater length. 
"Where Congress has authorized inspection but made 
no rules governing the procedures that inspectors must 
follow," the Court explained that a warrant would be 
necessary "to protect the owner from the 'unbridled 
discretion [of] executive and administrative officers."' 
Where Congress has made rules governing inspection 
procedures, however, a warrantless inspection could 
be upheld, but only if Congress' regime "establishes 
a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence" 
that does not "leav[e] the frequency and purpose of in-
spections to the unchecked discretion of Government 
officers." 
In the first phase of administrative search doctrine, 
then, the Court dispensed with the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement of individualized suspicion only 
for dragnet searches that complied with three basic 
values of the Fourth Amendment. First, the searches 
had to be justified in terms of the balance between the 
importance of the government's interest and the degree 
of intrusion upon individuals. That the searches at is-
sue aimed to serve health and safety needs was an im-
portant fact on both sides of this balance: The health 
and safety needs at issue were considered serious, but 
the fact that the search did not threaten the citizen with 
the normal apparatus of law enforcement helped the 
intrusion on privacy seem relatively minimal. Sec-
ond, dispensing with the requirement of individualized 
suspicion had to be necessary in order to advance the 
governmental interest at stake. Third, the searches had 
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to be cabined in ways that limited the discretion of ex-
ecutive officials, lest permission to conduct searches 
without individualized suspicion become a license to 
engage in arbitrary or harassing behavior. 
Special subpopulations (1976-1987) 
In the 1980s, the Court expanded the administrative 
search exception and allowed the government to escape 
the Fourth Amendment's warrant and individualized 
probable cause requirements in a second type of case. 
The new category involved what I will call "special 
subpopulations." Special subpopulations are groups of 
individuals with reduced expectations of privacy, in-
cluding students, government employees, probation-
ers, and parolees. Beginning at this time, the Court 
began permitting warrantless searches of members of 
these special subpopulations based on mere reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing, rather than probable cause. 
As was true of dragnets, these special subpopulation 
searches were predicated on an asserted government 
need that was independent of law enforcement. But 
along all three of the dimensions identified above as 
essential for permissible dragnets, special subpopula-
tion searches were different. 
The first difference concerned the balance between 
the government's interest and the degree of intrusion 
on privacy. In general, special subpopulation searches 
are more intrusive than the early dragnets were'. Drag-
nets typically involved cursory inspections of rela-
tively nonprivate areas. Housing inspectors went into 
basements to look at pipes; they did not go into bed-
rooms to read diaries. In contrast, special subpopula-
tion searches often involved full-blown searches of 
people or personal property. 
Second, special subpopulation searches featured 
a reduction in the degree of individualized suspicion 
required to authorize a search, rather than a complete 
elimination of the individualized suspicion require-
ment. Special subpopulation searches were thus ini-
tially created as an exception to the probable cause 
requirement but not necessarily to individualized sus-
picion altogether. 
Third, the prospect of executive discretion was 
much less troubling to the Court in the context of spe-
cial subpopulations. Government officials did not need 
to obtain warrants or rely on preexisting statutory or 
regulatory regimes before performing a special sub-
population administrative search. Rather, to cabin ex-
ecutive discretion, the Court relied on a post hoc analy-
sis of the reasonableness of the government's showing 
of individualized suspicion. 
In addition, the two kinds of searches raise different 
issues simply on the basis of the different background 
assumptions, in each case, about the people who are 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters 
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searched. Dragnets involve blanket intrusions on en-
tire populations with the knowledge that many or even 
most of those searched will be innocent. In contrast, 
special subpopulation searches are targeted. They fo-
cus on specific individuals, much as routine investiga-
tive practices do. In one sense, this difference makes 
special subpopulation searches less troubling than 
dragnet searches as a constitutional matter: They bur-
den people whom the Court has already designated as 
having reduced expectations of privacy, whereas drag-
nets routinely invade the privacy interests of individu-
als who have full expectations of privacy. On the other 
hand, special subpopulation searches are more likely 
to carry the stigmatic burdens associated with the sus-
picion of wrongdoing. Indeed, these burdens on the 
people searched are aggravated in the special subpopu-
lation context precisely because such searches often 
target people, such as probationers and parolees, who 
are already treated as marginal or deserving of less re-
spect than the population as a whole. 
The entanglement of dragnet and special subpopu-
lation searches was gradual. It occurred at least in 
part because there are a number of factual scenarios 
in which either rationale could justify a government 
search. Imagine, for example, that the government 
stops a traveler going through customs at an interna-
tional airport. The stop could be conducted pursuant 
to a dragnet policy under which people who enter the 
country are automatically stopped and questioned. 
Alternatively, if the traveler was acting suspiciously 
when he approached customs, the stop might also be 
justified within the special subpopulation framework: 
People who cross the border have reduced expectations 
of privacy, and this individual's conduct created rea-
sonable suspicion, even if not probable cause. Thus, it 
may be helpful to think of the dragnet and special sub-
population variants of administrative search doctrine 
as different theories with which the government can 
justify a given search rather than as describing differ-
ent factual scenarios in which searches occur. Just as 
there are different exceptions to the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements that might justify a car search 
in a given case, there may be alternative ways that the 
government could justify an administrative search. 
The two administrative search rationales can appear 
in tandem for other reasons as well. For example, even 
if the two arguments might not justify exactly the same 
intrusion on privacy, they might be germane at different 
moments within the same litigated encounter. Consider 
vehicle sobriety checkpoints. Cars that are stopped when 
approaching a sobriety checkp0int are typically stopped 
pursuant to a dragnet policy that requires police to stop 
every vehicle that passes through the checkpoint. The 
decision regarding whom to refer to a secondary inspec-
© 2012 Thomson Reuters 
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tion area, however, is an individualized decision to fur-
ther scrutinize a person who has a reduced expectation 
of privacy. In a case challenging a search conducted at a 
sobriety checkpoint, therefore, both kinds of administra-
tive search arguments might be in play. 
Given the overlapping and sequential ways in which 
these two doctrines can apply, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that the Supreme Court was not always clear about 
where one rationale ended and the other began. Indeed, 
the Court took its first step toward entangling dragnet 
and special subpopulation searches in a case involving 
both a dragnet and an individualized intrusion. In U.S. v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), border patrol of-
ficials looking for illegal aliens stopped the respondents' 
cars as part of fixed dragnet immigration checkpoints 
near the Mexican border and then ref erred some cars to 
secondary inspection areas where the drivers and pas-
sengers were questioned. The initial stop was a dragnet 
seizure of all cars that drove through the checkpoint, and 
it was conducted pursuant to a magistrate's warrant. The 
decision regarding whom to refer to a secondary inspec-
tion area, however, was an individualized decision left to 
the discretion of the border patrol official. 
Had the Court focused clearly on the two different 
phases of the encounter, it might have evaluated the 
initial stop as administrative in the dragnet sense and 
then evaluated the secondary and individualized ques-
tioning as an intrusion upon persons with a reduced 
expectation of privacy. But the Martinez-Fuerte Court 
failed to distinguish between the initial checkpoint 
where everyone was stopped and the secondary deten-
tion where border patrol officials selectively subjected 
a chosen few to additional scrutiny. Rather, the Court 
characterized the entire exchange as one form of legiti-
mate administrative search that need not be supported 
by any showing of reasonable or articulable suspicion. 
It used the framework for justifying the initial dragnet 
traffic stop to legitimate both parts of the intrusion. In 
so doing, it for the first time upheld an individualized 
search or seizure-the secondary questioning-on an 
administrative search rationale. 
The Martinez-Fuerte Court's importation of special 
subpopulation searches into the administrative search 
exception was not explicit. The Court never actually 
stated that individualized intrusions could be upheld as 
administrative searches. Rather, it glossed over the indi-
vidualized nature of the intrusion by lumping it together 
with the initial dragnet stop. It was not until 1985 that 
the Court explicitly incorporated special subpopulation 
searches into the administrative search category. 
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the 
Supreme Court upheld a vice principal's warrantless, 
discretionary decision to search an individual high 
school student's purse without probable cause. Relying 
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on its decision in Camara, the T.L.O. Court found that 
there was an important non-law enforcement need to 
maintain order in the schools and that this need justi-
fied dispensing with the warrant and probable cause 
requirements, just as the need to maintain housing 
· safety had done earlier. The Court further cited Marti-
nez-Fuerte to support the idea that a warrant supported 
by individualized probable cause is not an indispens-
able requirement of the Fourth Amendment. That is, 
the Court drew on two dragnet administrative search 
cases to establish the propriety of relaxing the Fourth 
Amendment's privacy protections in a case involving 
no nondiscretionary dragnet at all, but instead a tar-
geted search of a person within a special subpopula-
tion having a reduced expectation of privacy. Because 
the government's interest in safety and order was suf-
ficiently important, the Court held that warrantless 
searches of students by school officials need only be 
justified under a reasonable suspicion standard. 
Although the T.L.O. Court did not explicitly char-
acterize the vice principal's search as administrative, 
the precedents on which it drew squarely situated the 
decision in the line of administrative search cases. 
Moreover, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion 
articulated a test-the "special needs" test-that the 
Court would use for determining the validity of ad-
ministrative searches in later cases. Under the special 
needs test, a court may dispense with the warrant and 
probable cause requirements "[o]nly in those excep-
tional circumstances in which special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant and probable cause requirement impracticable." If 
the government can demonstrate that it has such a spe-
cial need, then the court will balance the government's 
interest against the degree of intrusion to determine 
whether a search is reasonable. If there is no special 
need, then the government needs to satisfy the require-
ments of the Warrant Clause before it may search. 
The rise of the special needs test helped complete the 
conflation of the two different rationales for administra-
tive searches, as the Court came to use the special needs 
test regardless of which type of search was at issue. 
Two years after T.L.O., the Court upheld the discretion-
ary search of an individual government employee's of-
fice by relying on the special needs test. See O'Connor 
v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 ( 1987). In so doing, the Court 
explicitly connected its special subpopulation and drag-
net precedents by emphasizing that Camara and T.L.O. 
were both cases involving special needs. 
Later that term, the Court officially imported the 
special needs test into the dragnet context. Writing 
for a majority of the Court in New York v. Burger, 482 
U.S. 691 (1987), Ju~tice Blackmun used his special 
needs test to uphold the dragnet search of a junkyard 
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pursuant to a state statute authorizing periodic inspec-
tions of vehicle-dismantling industries. Since Burger, 
the Court has invoked the special needs test to assess 
individualized special subpopulation searches of pro-
bationers as well as dragnet drug testing procedures 
aimed at patients in public hospitals, government em-
ployees, and public school students. See Bd. of Educ. 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Ferguson v. Charleston, 
532 U.S. 67 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat'/ Treasury Emps. Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). By the late 1980s, it ceased to 
matter whether an administrative search was a dragnet 
or a discretionary search of an individual who was a 
member of a special subpopulation with reduced ex-
pectations of privacy. The test was the same; the en-
tanglement was complete. 
The effects of entanglement 
Once dragnet and special subpopulation searches 
were lumped together, administrative search doctrine 
evolved in response to the conflation. Many of the 
safeguards that the Supreme Court had implemented to 
protect citizens against arbitrary and unnecessary gov-
ernment intrusions in each context were fundamentally 
inapposite to the other. As a result, the Court frequently 
found itself adjudicating cases in which doctrinal safe-
guards previously implemented for "administrative 
searches" seemed out of place. It responded by weak-
ening or eliminating those safeguards, and, in so doing, 
created an administrative search doctrine that permits 
arbitrary, unnecessary, and highly-intrusive govern-
ment intrusions. 
Arbitrary government intrusions 
Dragnets. Whereas the Court had focused on lim-
iting government discretion in dragnet cases in order 
to prevent arbitrary intrusions, searches of individuals 
who were members of special subpopulations required 
discretion. Something had to give. The tension was ap-
parent in U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
In discussing the border officials' conduct during the 
initial dragnet stop of the cars at the checkpoint, the 
Court focused on the need to eliminate executive dis-
cretion. Distinguishing the fixed checkpoint in Mar-
tinez-Fuerte from the roving stops that it had struck 
down in the past, the Court noted that these officers 
lacked discretion to determine where to locate a check-
point and which cars to detain, thus reducing the risk of 
abusive or harassing stops. The Court further noted that 
the checkpoint was established in accordance with a 
magistrate's warrant of inspection. But when the Court 
began to analyze the border officials' actions in refer-
ring the respondents to the secondary inspection areas, 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters 
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its attitude toward discretion changed entirely. Rather 
than ask whether the officers had only limited discre-
tion with respect to secondary inspections, the Court 
embraced government discretion as a necessary feature 
of secondary stops. Indeed, it specifically declared that 
border patrol officials must have "wide discretion" in 
selecting which motorists should be subjected to fur-
ther scrutiny and that many incidents of checkpoint 
operation must be "committed to the discretion of such 
officials." Thus, the discretion that was a primary evil 
to be avoided in dragnet searches was not only permis-
sible but embraced as important and necessary when 
the intrusion at issue was individualized. 
Had the Martinez-Fuerte majority cleanly distin-
guished between the two types of intrusions at issue, 
it might have made the sensible point that executive 
discretion should be eliminated for one phase of the 
encounter but not for the other. But because the Court 
failed to foreground (or perhaps even to notice) that 
distinction, its discussion of discretion simply seemed 
muddled and self-contradictory. 
Three years later, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979), the Court struck down roving vehicle stops 
to check drivers' licenses, because the police had too 
much discretion in choosing which vehicles to stop. At 
first blush, Prouse appears to support limits on govern-
ment discretion, but the Court's language and analysis 
actually dilute the requirement that administrative re-
gimes limit government discretion. Shortly after stating 
that the roving stops at issue involved standardless and 
unconstrained discretion, the Court wrote that its previ-
ous cases had "insisted that the discretion of the official 
in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." 
This qualifying language was new, and it represented 
a substantial weakening of the Court's prior language 
about the need to limit government discretion. 
Similarly, the Prouse Court read Martinez-Fuerte 
in a way that downplayed that prior decision's fo-
cus on eliminating discretion during the first phase 
of the roadblock search- that is, the portion sensibly 
analyzed as a dragnet. As noted above, the Court in 
Martinez-Fuerte had emphasized that roving-stop re-
gimes involve greater executive discretion than check-
point regimes. Prouse omitted that portion of Marti-
nez-Fuerte 's analysis entirely, instead describing the 
crucial difference between the roving stops that it had 
struck down and the checkpoints upheld in Martinez-
Fuerte as a difference in degree of intrusion. That is, 
it rested the distinction on the proposition that roving 
stops are more subjectively intrusive than checkpoint 
stops, a consideration that sounds in the balance be-
tween government and individual interests rather than 
in the need to limit governmental discretion. To be fair, 
the Martinez-Fuerte Court did draw this distinction: 
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Martinez-Fuerte, like Prouse, took the position that 
roving stops are more intrusive. But Martinez-Fuerte 
also called attention to the problem of governmental 
discretion, and Prouse omitted that concern entirely. 
Four years later, the Court took the further step of 
transforming the requirement of limited governmen-
tal discretion into a mere factor that the Court may or 
may not consider as part of a reasonableness balanc-
ing test. In U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 
( 1983), the Supreme Court approved a statutory regime 
that allowed for completely discretionary decisions by 
customs officials to stop and board any ship in United 
States waters for the purpose of inspecting the ship's 
documentation. Yes, the Court said, Prouse had dis-
cussed the interest in limiting discretion, and people 
certainly had the right to travel without purely discre-
tionary intrusions from law enforcement officers. But 
the overall focus in administrative search law, the Vil-
lamonte-Marquez Court maintained, was on whether a 
law enforcement practice was "reasonable" -a matter 
to be judged by balancing the practice's intrusion on 
the individual's privacy interests against the govern-
ment's interests. There was no longer a separate and 
distinct requirement that administrative search regimes 
limit government discretion. 
Since Villamonte-Marquez, the Court routinely 
fails to consider whether a challenged administrative 
search regime limits executive discretion. To be sure, 
the decreasing concern with discretion in this line of 
cases should be understood as a general trend rather 
than a steady and constant pattern. A few dragnet cases 
have continued to discuss the need to limit government 
discretion, and perhaps others will in the future. But 
such discussions are now the exception rather than the 
norm. What was once a robust requirement in dragnet 
search cases is now a mere factor that a court might or 
might not consider. 
Moreover, when the Court does refer to the need 
to limit government discretion in dragnet regimes, its 
analysis often fails to engage seriously with the ques-
tion of whether the administrative regime in question 
actually limits discretion. Consider New York v. Burger, 
482 U.S. 691 (1987), which remains the Court's lead-
ing decision on business inspections. In that case, the 
police searched a junkyard pursuant to a state statute 
authorizing periodic inspections of vehicle-dismantling 
industries, and the Court upheld the search. Burger was 
decided only five years after Villamonte-Marquez, and 
the Burger Court identified the elimination of execu-
tive discretion as one of the factors that courts should 
analyze in determining whether a business inspection 
scheme is constitutionally reasonable even without a 
warrant requirement. In particular, the Court suggested 
that the existence of a statute providing for inspections 
67 
September 2012 Volume 39, Number 8 
is a sufficient substitute for a warrant. But apparently 
the Court meant this suggestion in the broadest pos-
sible sense: The mere existence of a statute did the 
trick, rendering it unnecessary to ask whether the stat-
ute's provisions actually limited discretion or, indeed, 
whether the officers conducting the search complied 
with whatever the statute did require. 
In Burger itself, the statute authorizing the search 
vested a lot of discretion in government officials. The 
statute's only limitations were that inspections must 
occur in the daytime, that the businesses subject to in-
spection must be in the vehicle-dismantling industry 
"and related industries," and that the inspectors must 
limit their examinations to vehicles, vehicle parts, and 
records. The statute did not specify how many searches 
were to be performed, or how frequently, or how busi-
nesses should be selected to be searched, or what "relat-
ed industries" would fall under the statute. More egre-
giously, the Court never examined whether the police 
who inspected Burger's business actually followed this 
statutory scheme. In Burger's case, the police did not 
limit their search to the vehicle, vehicle parts, and re-
cords in Burger's business. All in all, then, it is hard to 
read the Court's analysis as embodying an actual con-
cern with limiting discretion. By creating a merged cat-
egory of administrative searches in which dragnets can 
be approved even without limits on executive discre-
tion, the Court has invited precisely the results that con-
sensus arguments for limiting discretion always warn 
about: arbitrary, capricious, and harassing intrusions. 
Special subpopulations. Administrative search doc-
trine had been shaped by the dragnet model, and drag-
nets are by definition exceptional searches that do not 
require individualized suspicion. If special subpopula-
tion searches were to be measured by the same criteria 
as dragnets, the requirement of individualized suspicion 
would naturally disappear. As was true of the Court's 
growing tolerance for discretion in dragnets, the process 
of removing the individualized suspicion requirement for 
special subpopulation searches has been gradual. 
In Martinez-Fuerte, the government officials admit-
ted that both the initial dragnet intrusion and the sub-
sequent secondary inspection were made without any 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. The absence 
of individualized suspicion was not a problem for the 
Court, however, because the Court analyzed the entire 
regime as a dragnet. In accordance with its precedents 
on dragnets, the Court considered whether an individu-
alized suspicion regime could reasonably satisfy the 
government's interest in detecting the entry of illegal 
aliens into the country. Finding that it could not, the 
Court cited Camara for the proposition that "the Fourth 
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of 
such suspicion." That was true for dragnet searches, 
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which were the only recognized administrative search-
es before Martinez-Fuerte. But Martinez-Fuerte failed 
to distinguish between the dragnet and the individual-
ized parts of the scheme it upheld, and later cases read 
the statement as applicable to both parts of the sce-
nario. Accordingly, Martinez-Fuerte came to suggest 
that the government can make discretionary decisions 
to search or seize members of special subpopulations 
without individualized suspicion. 
Between 1976 and 2006, the Supreme Court decided 
five administrative search cases involving special sub-
populations rather than dragnets. See U.S. v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); 
U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Because 
the government had individualized suspicion in each of 
these cases, none of the cases presented the question of 
whether individualized suspicion was a prerequisite in 
special subpopulation searches. That said, the cases did 
furnish opportunities for important dicta on the ques-
tion. In T.L.O., for example, the Court cited Martinez-
Fuerte and Camara for the proposition that individu-
alized suspicion is not an irreducible requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Court reiterated the point 
in both Knights, involving probationer searches, and 
Ortega, involving searches of government employees' 
offices. In short, the idea that the Fourth Amendment 
could be satisfied without individualized suspicion be-
came a regularly articulated proposition even outside 
the exceptional context of dragnets. 
A contemporaneous development in administrative 
search law helped push that idea to its logical conclu-
sion. While the idea that the Fourth Amendment could 
tolerate searches without individualized suspicion was 
migrating from the dragnet context to that of special 
subpopulation searches, another doctrine-the special 
needs test-was being extended from the special sub-
population context to that of dragnets. As discussed 
above, the special needs test originated in the context of 
searches of members of special subpopulations, where 
it functioned as a test of whether the government could 
justify a search with a showing of mere reasonable sus-
picion rather than probable cause. Under the special 
needs test as classically articulated, the question for a 
court to answer was whether a case presented "excep-
tional circumstances in which special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant and probable-cause requirements impracticable." 
When the Court began using this formula in dragnet 
cases, however, it began understanding its language in 
a different way. 
In the special subpopulation context, departing from 
the probable cause requirement meant analyzing indi-
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vidualized suspicion only at the level of reasonable-
ness. But the normal question about dragnet searches 
is whether serving a particular government interest 
justifies eliminating the requirement of individualized 
suspicion entirely. For the special needs test to work in 
the dragnet context, the language about the impractica-
bility of the probable cause requirement had to be un-
derstood as authorizing an exception to the individual-
ized suspicion requirement more generally, not merely 
the heightened form of individualized suspicion called 
probable cause. Eventually, the Court slightly modi-
fied the wording of the special needs test to reflect this 
changed understanding: In his opinion for the Court 
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 
489 U.S. 656 (1989), a case involving a drug testing 
dragnet, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[w]here a Fourth 
Amendment intrusion serves special government needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is nec-
essary to balance the individual's privacy expectations 
against the Government's interests to determine wheth-
er it is impractical to require a warrant or some level 
of individualized suspicion in the particular context." 
The transformation was complete. Having been passed 
through the filter of dragnet doctrine, the primary test 
used to analyze special subpopulation searches now 
authorizes an explicit exception to any individualized 
suspicion requirement, rather than merely reducing the 
level of individualized suspicion that the government 
is required to show. And so in the more recent case of 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), in which 
the Court upheld a discretionary, warrantless, and sus-
picionless search of a parolee, Justice Thomas' opinion 
for the majority had no apparent trouble maintaining 
that the Fourth Amendment imposed no requirement of 
individualized suspicion whatsoever. 
The scope of Samson is not clear, but its potential 
reach is quite expansive. Straightforward application 
of Samson would permit discretionary and suspicion-
less searches of members of other special subpopula-
tions with reduced expectations of privacy. But this 
state of the doctrine is built upon a failure to recognize 
critical differences between dragnet and individual-
ized searches. Unlike in the dragnet context, there is 
no demonstrated need in these special subpopulation 
searches for the government to proceed without show-
ing some quantum of individualized suspicion. And in-
deed, if special subpopulation searches are considered 
on their own, the argument for eliminating the indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement seems weak. More 
or less everyone agrees that the Fourth Amendment is 
supposed to protect citizens from arbitrary, harassing, 
or discriminatory government conduct. It is a similarly 
commonsense proposition that if the police are permit-
ted to search individuals without warrants and without 
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any individualized suspicion, the amount of arbitrary 
and discriminatory government conduct will increase. 
Unnecessary dragnets 
Once it seems reasonable to conduct discretionary 
searches without individualized suspicion, it can also 
seem less important to limit suspicionless dragnets to 
exceptional circumstances where they are truly neces-
sary. Administrative search doctrine has accordingly 
seen the removal of the traditional preference for indi-
vidualized suspicion regimes over dragnets, which has 
increased the incidence of unnecessary dragnets. 
Just three years after Martinez-Fuerte implicitly 
opened the door to regarding individualized searches 
as administrative, the Court took its first step toward 
eliminating the preference for individualized suspi-
cion regimes over dragnets. In Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47, 51 (1979), the Court noted that "the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on 
specific, objective facts indicating that society's le-
gitimate interests require the seizure of the particular 
individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pur-
suant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations 
on the conduct of individual officers." Although not 
immediately apparent at the time, the Court's use of 
the disjunctive here reflected its new attitude toward 
searches. In its later cases, the Court relied on Brown 
to emphasize that searches could be predicated on ei-
ther individualized suspicion or a neutral plan, but it no 
longer asked whether the goals of a neutral plan might 
be accomplished through an alternative individualized 
suspicion regime. 
As with the other lines of fallout from the cross-
contamination, this change was neither immediate 
nor clean: A few dragnet cases after Brown v. Texas 
did examine whether alternatives predicated on indi-
vidualized suspicion would adequately satisfy the gov-
ernment's goals. But most did not. In an increasingly 
regular pattern, the Court approved dragnet regimes for 
business inspections, maritime shipping, and motorist 
sobriety with no discussion of whether individualized 
suspicion regimes might adequately serve the govern-
ment's interests. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444 (1990); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 
691 (1987); U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 
(1983); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
Perhaps the most salient example of this trend away 
from a preference for individualized suspicion regimes 
is Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. In that 
case, the Court relied on Brown v. Texas to uphold a 
temporary sobriety checkpoint designed to stop drunk 
driving. At no point in its decision did the Court con-
sider whether an individualized suspicion regime might 
effectively serve the state's interest in preventing drunk 
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driving. Justice Stevens' dissent underscored the inef-
fectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint and emphasized 
that a higher arrest rate might have occurred if the po-
lice had relied on the conventional Fourth Amendment 
investigative techniques that required individualized 
suspicion. In discussing the number of arrests that the 
police made at the checkpoint, Justice Stevens noted 
that "there is absolutely no evidence that this figure 
represents an increase over the number of arrests that 
would have been made by using the same law enforce-
ment resources in conventional patrols .... Drunken 
driving, unlike [alien] smuggling, may thus be detected 
absent any checkpoints." 
However, a majority of the Court approved of the 
dragnet administrative search regime, emphasizing 
that "the choice among such reasonable alternatives 
remains with the governmental officials." The govern-
ment need not rely on less intrusive, individualized 
suspicion regimes. Rather, in the Court's present view, 
the government has the latitude to choose among rea-
sonable alternatives, and a dragnet search can be just 
one more reasonable alternative, rather than a disfa-
vored last resort. 
As science and technology advance, dragnet inves-
tigative tools will become cheaper, more readily avail-
able, and easier to use. Now that administrative search 
doctrine no longer requires the government to show 
that an individualized search regime is inadequate or 
unavailable, there is nothing to stop executive officials 
from employing more and more dragnet investigative 
techniques. We have, in fact, already seen evidence of 
this trend. If dragnets lose their legally disfavored sta-
tus at the same time as they become more technologi-
cally feasible, they will become routine. As a result, 
many more innocent individuals will be subjected to 
unnecessary government intrusions. 
Highly-intrusive searches 
One consequence of the elimination of the indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement from administrative 
search doctrine is that the permissibility of searches is 
often governed only by an all-things-considered rea-
sonableness standard. The reasonableness standard 
currently in use is unnecessarily broad and too deferen-
tial to the government. Courts define the governmental 
interests broadly and the privacy interests narrowly, 
such that in practice the balancing test operates as a 
form of rational basis review under which the govern-
ment presumptively wins. 
The entanglement of dragnet and special subpopu-
lation searches is partly to blame for this overly broad 
and highly deferential reasonableness standard. Drag-
net searches prototypically involve generalized gov-
ernment health or safety interests and concrete, but 
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minimal, privacy intrusions. Area housing inspec-
tions are a good example. The government interest in 
safety is broadly stated, but the inspection is cursory 
and represents a minimal privacy intrusion. In con-
trast, special subpopulation searches typically involve 
much greater privacy intrusions and more concrete 
government interests. A search of a student's purse is 
personal and invasive, but it can be justified by the 
concrete suspicion that the student is violating the 
school's drug use policies. When the two categories 
were fused into one, however, the result was a body of 
case law including both precedents upholding search-
es based on generalized government interests (from 
the dragnet cases) and precedents upholding invasive 
privacy intrusions (from the special subpopulation 
cases). Not surprisingly, government lawyers charged 
with defending searches in court drew from both sets 
of cases. The courts have not regarded any of this as 
out of bounds: After all, the government lawyers are 
citing cases setting forth both the kinds of interests 
that justify "administrative searches" and the kinds of 
privacy invasions that "administrative searches" may 
validly involve. The result is a doctrine characterized 
by large privacy intrusions predicated on generalized 
government interests. 
Consider People v. Smith, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106 (Ct. 
App. 2009), in which the government successfully re-
lied on its generalized interest in preventing recidivism 
to justify the warrantless, suspicionless inspection of 
a parolee's genitalia. The case arose when a police of-
ficer saw Smith, a known parolee, in a car in the back 
parking lot of a hotel. The officer stopped Smith, pat-
ted him down, and searched his car, but he did not find 
any contraband. Relying on Smith's status as a parolee, 
the police officer then removed Smith's belt, pulled 
his pants away from his body, and visually inspected 
Smith's genitalia. One might imagine that this conduct 
would be deemed unreasonable on a general balancing 
test or that the question would at least be a close one. 
After all, a state's interest in reducing recidivism might 
justify some extra supervision of parolees, but if any-
thing is a serious invasion of privacy, being forced to 
expose one's private parts to the police would seem to 
qualify. Moreover, the officer had already patted Smith 
down and searched the car and had not found any con-
traband. Nonetheless, the California Court of Appeal 
upheld the search, relying on Samson for the general 
proposition that the state has an interest in reducing 
recidivism and reintegrating former prisoners into so-
ciety. When addressing the highly invasive nature of 
the search, the court stated that, because his "belt was 
the only item of clothing removed, his private parts 
were not exposed, and [he was not] touched[,] ... [t]he 
intrusion ... did not constitute a broad invasion of his 
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privacy and dignity rights." In short, the court down-
played the privacy invasion and read the government 
interest expansively in order to uphold the search. 
Perhaps a bit less inflammatorily-but similarly il-
lustrative of the propensity to let generalized govern-
ment interests "outweigh" concrete individual privacy 
concerns- the Supreme Court has allowed school of-
ficials to conduct regular drug testing of middle school 
students-without a warrant, and without any suspi-
cion of a drug problem among that population-on the 
grounds that the students participate in extracurricular 
activities such as choir and marching band. See Bd. of 
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). And drivers are 
now routinely stopped and detained at sobriety check-
points without any judicial or legislative preclearance, 
even when data suggests that stops based on individu-
alized suspicion might be more effective at deterring 
drunk driving. See Mich. Dep 't of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
To be sure, the entanglement of dragnet and special 
subpopulation searches does not completely explain 
why courts have permitted these intrusions. But it does 
so in part. Specifically, the courts' use of generalized 
statements about government interests and their lack 
of differentiation between different levels of privacy 
intrusion are, in some respects, outgrowths of their 
using the same "special needs" test for both dragnet 
and special subpopulation searches, irrespective of the 
different issues that the two kinds of searches raise. 
When the T.L.O. Court created the special needs test 
for determining when reasonableness balancing should 
displace the warrant and probable cause requirements, 
it carefully delineated the reasons why the require-
ments were impracticable under the circumstances of 
that case. But when the Court imported the special 
needs test into the dragnet context, those same argu-
ments carried less weight. A school can easily seek a 
warrant before implementing a dragnet drug testing 
policy, even if it is cumbersome to get a warrant before 
searching a student's backpack after a teacher observes 
what he thinks is a violation of the school's drug poli-
cies. Conversely, the teacher who wants to search that 
backpack should have no problem meeting a threshold 
requirement of individualized suspicion, even though 
it might defeat the purpose of a dragnet drug testing 
policy to require the school to show individualized sus-
picion before testing any particular student. 
To recognize these differences, however, would re-
quire recognizing that dragnet searches. are different 
from special subpopulation searches. Having merged 
them together, the Court now uses the same special 
needs test in all public school cases, as if "special 
needs" were a condition that attaches to the public 
school setting rather than a way of assessing whether 
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some feature of the search justifies dispensing with the 
warrant and individualized suspicion requirements. 
This is confused. Whether there are special needs that 
justify dispensing with those requirements is not sim-
ply a function of where the search is performed. But, 
as presently configured, administrative search doctrine 
can be used to justify warrantless and suspicionless 
searches even under circumstances compatible with 
requiring warrants or showings of individualized sus-
picion. The result is more unnecessary intrusions, both 
in dragnet and in targeted form. 
Conclusion 
In its current form, administrative search doctrine 
does little to check arbitrary, unnecessary, or harass-
ing searches. The problem will only become worse as 
technology expands the government's investigative 
arsenal. Dragnet searches are on the rise, and current 
doctrine has no means of ensuring that they will be 
employed only when necessary, nor that officials' dis-
cretion will be appropriately limited when dragnets are 
used. Moreover, the Supreme Court has begun to ap-
prove wholly suspicionless and highly invasive search-
es of individuals who belong to groups considered to 
have reduced expectations of privacy. One important 
step toward reform involves disentangling dragnet and 
special subpopulation searches and measuring each by 
criteria that better fit the issues that each kind raises. 
One important step toward reform 
involves disentangling dragnet 
and special subpopulation 
searches and measuring each by 
criteria that better fit the issues 
that each kind raises. 
For dragnet intrusions, the courts should restore the 
two threshold requirements that existed before the cross-
contamination. First, before a court engages in reason-
ableness balancing, it should ask whether the govern-
ment has taken steps to effectively limit the discretion 
of the officials executing the dragnet so as to prevent 
arbitrary, discriminatory, and harassing intrusions. One 
means of satisfying this requirement would be by re-
quiring a warrant issued by a neutral and detached mag-
istrate, as contemplated in Camara, or at least by some 
other form of referral to a third-party decisionmaker. 
Another is to proceed pursuant to a statute that clearly 
defines when and how the government should perform 
an administrative intrusion with sufficient limitations 
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on government discretion. But if the government has 
not taken any such steps to limit discretion, then the 
dragnet should only be upheld if the government can 
rely on some other exception to the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements to justify its actions. 
Second, the courts should consider dragnets to be a 
disfavored method of investigation -permissible only 
when individualized suspicion cannot be required-
rather than as one of several reasonable ways of pro-
ceeding. If an individualized suspicion regime could 
adequately advance the government's interests, then a 
dragnet should be deemed constitutionally unreason-
able. After all, dragnets always invade the privacy and 
security interests of innocent citizens, and such inva-
sions should be tolerated only when they are necessary. 
Otherwise, as science and technology advance, govern-
ment intrusions are likely to become both more inva-
sive and more routine. And the effects of such intru-
sions on individual privacy need to be considered not 
individually but in the aggregate. A world in which the 
government routinely searches everyone is not one with 
significant regard for privacy as we understand it, nor is 
it one where privacy can be restored by correcting a few 
of the most visible or objectionable intrusions. 
On the special subpopulation side, one important 
step would be to avoid the one-size-permits-everything 
reasoning that now accompanies the special needs test. 
Rather than declaring that special needs exist in certain 
reduced-expectation-of-privacy contexts such that no 
searches conducted in those contexts need satisfy the 
Warrant Clause, courts should ask whether complying 
with the warrant and probable cause requirements is ac-
tually impractical in a given kind of case. In determin-
ing whether to waive the warrant requirement, a court 
could consider how easy it is to obtain a warrant in the 
jurisdiction, whether some other form of preclearance 
might be available to protect against arbitrary govern-
ment action, and whether exigent circumstances make 
even small delays untenable, as when a suspect might 
escape or do violence before the warrant process could 
be completed. In assessing whether to waive the prob-
able cause requirement, a court might consider whether 
the person conducting the search can be expected to un-
derstand the probable cause requirement, whether that 
person has a relationship to the person being searchea, 
and whether anything else about the context indicates 
that a probable cause requirement would undermine an 
important government interest. When a probable cause 
requirement is not appropriate, however, the govern-
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ment should still be required to show some reduced 
form of individualized suspicion to justify its intrusion. 
Authorizing suspicionless searches merely because the 
probable cause requirement seems too strict borrows 
inappropriately from the example of dragnets, where 
we accept that people will be searched even though 
they are not individually suspected of wrongdoing. 
Special subpopulation searches involve discretionary 
decisions to target particular individuals or groups of 
individuals, and the government should have to explain 
why it selected those individuals to bear the burdens of 
being searched. Wholly suspicionless searches, like the 
one upheld in Samson, should be impermissible. 
Finally, there is the question of how courts should ad-
dress scenarios in which the search at issue is a dragnet 
search of members of special subpopulations that have 
reduced expectations of privacy. When both the drag-
net and special subpopulation rationales might apply, 
the court should require the government to articulate 
which it is relying on and, depending on the answer, 
apply different doctrinal tests to determine the search's 
validity. If the government claims that the reduced ex-
pectations of privacy of a special subpopulation mem-
ber justify its actions, it should have to demonstrate 
why the warrant and probable cause requirements are 
impractical in that situation. And even if it is unrealis-
tic to require probable cause, the government should 
have to demonstrate that there was some level of in-
dividualized suspicion to justify targeting the person 
searched (although the quantum of individualized sus-
picion required will vary depending on the situation). 
Alternatively, if the government contends that it should 
be exempted from the individualized suspicion re-
quirement altogether because it is relying on a dragnet 
search, it should have to demonstrate, as a threshold 
matter, that there are limitations on the exercise of ex-
ecutive discretion and that an individualized suspicion 
regime would not be equally effective in achieving its · 
goals. Once it satisfies those requirements, it still must 
pass muster under the reasonableness balancing test. 
Disentangling dragnets from special subpopula-
tion searches will bring some much-needed clarity to 
administrative search law. Such clarification might 
or might not persuade decisionmakers to restore ap-
propriate threshold requirements about discretion and 
individualized suspicion. If it did, so much the better. 
And even if not, it would help make plain the extent 
of the costs to privacy under present administrative 
search law. 
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